In classical two-party computation, a trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations, known as one-time tables, can help make the inputs of both parties information-theoretically secure. We propose some bipartite quantum protocols with possible aborts for approximately generating such bipartite classical correlations with varying degrees of privacy, without introducing a third party. Under some weak requirements for the parties, the security level is nontrivial for use in bipartite computation. We show that the security is usually dependent on the noise level, but not for some party in one of the protocols. The security is "forced security", which implies that the probability that some useful one-time tables are generated can approach 1 in the noiseless case under quite weak assumptions about the parties, although the protocols allow aborts. We show how to use the generated one-time tables to achieve nontrivial information-theoretic security in generic two-party classical or quantum computation tasks, including (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption. Our methods provide check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations, including the PR-box type, with the help of communication which carry no information about the inputs in the generated correlations. arXiv:1908.05584v3 [quant-ph] 
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of two-party computation is a main research topic in classical cryptography. The goal is usually to correctly compute some function of the inputs from the two parties, while keeping the inputs as private from the opposite party as possible. This has been studied using classical homomorphic encryption techniques [1, 2] or through implementing Yao's "Garbled Circuit" solution [3] . Another possibility is to introduce a trusted third party, who may sometimes interact with the two parties for multiple rounds. To lower the requirement on the trusted third party, a "trusted initializer" has been proposed [4] . Such trusted initializer only prepares some initial correlations between the two parties, and does not interact with any party afterwards. A trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations, referred to as "one-time tables", can help make the bipartite computation secure.
Secure two-party quantum computation is the corresponding problem in quantum computing and quantum cryptography. The two parties wish to correctly compute an output according to some public or private program while keeping their (quantum) inputs as secure as possible. Special cases of this general problem include quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , secure * Electronic address: yupapers@sina.com assisted quantum computation [18, 19] , computing on shared quantum secrets [20] , and physically-motivated secure computation (e.g. [21] ). In the study of QHE, it is found that secure computation of the modulo-2 inner product of two bit strings provided by the two parties is a key task, and the one-time tables mentioned above turn out to be helpful for this task.
In this work, we propose two-party quantum protocols with aborts as replacements for the trusted initializer in preparing the one-time tables, and show that the prepared one-time tables can help achieve nontrivial degrees of information-theoretic security in bipartite classical or quantum computation. Our main protocols are based on Protocol 1 which implements the following task approximately with partial privacy: it takes as input two locally-generated random bits x and y from Alice and Bob, respectively, and outputs two bits (x AND y) XOR r and r on the two parties, where r is a random bit. The one-time table contains four bits: two input bits and two output bits. By putting the possible aborts in the preprocessing which does not involve useful data, we partly avoid the problem of data leakage in those aborted runs in other possible protocols with aborts.
Security in quantum key distribution [22] is dependent on verifications. Inspired by this, we propose some protocols that verify the correctness of Protocol 1. We propose Protocol 3 to select some one-time tables generated by Protocol 1. It allows Bob to abort during the protocol when he finds that Alice is cheating. When Protocol 3 is used in a generic interactive bipartite classical computation with the roles of Alice and Bob switched, the data leakage of Alice is asymptotically vanishing for noiseless physical systems, but for noisy physical systems, the leakage is linearly related to the noise level. The data privacy of Bob is partial: the leakage is about half of his input bits, but the privacy is better in the case that the function is a many-to-one map for Bob's input, including the case that the function effectively evaluates universal circuits.
We then propose Protocol 4 which includes checks from both sides to ensure that the average rate of cheating by any party is asymptotically vanishing. For the bipartite computation task, the data leakage of any party is asymptotically vanishing for noiseless systems, while for noisy systems, the leakage of both parties are linearly related to the noise level.
We then propose Protocol 5 which combines several one-time tables generated by Protocol 3 or 4 into one. When Protocol 5 based on Protocol 3 is used in bipartite classical computation, the data leakage of Alice is asymptotically vanishing, and almost independent of the physical errors, as discussed in Sec. VII, while the data privacy of Bob is worse than that in Protocol 3 under comparable resource cost.
All the protocols above are secure in the honest-butcurious model. An honest-but-curious party is one who follows the protocol while possibly making measurements which do not affect the final computation result. In our protocols, an honest-but-curious party does not learn anything about the other party's data, while the privacy of his or her own data is guaranteed to reach the targeted level even if the other party cheats.
The following remarks are for the general malicious case. In Protocol 3, the security of Bob's data is dependent on that he is conservative, meaning that he values the privacy of his data higher than the possibility to learn Alice's data; Alice needs to be weakly cooperating for the protocols not to abort, meaning that she does not cheat much in some batch of the instances of Protocol 1. For Alice's data security to be enhanced by her verifications in Protocol 4, she should be conservative in the sense described above. But partly due to the possible aborts, it actually suffices to assume one of the parties is conservative in Protocol 4, since then the other party might as well be conservative to reach a better security level for himself (herself) . Although Protocol 5 is quite effective when there is no noise (including errors), it may not be better than Protocol 3 or 4 when there is some non-negligible level of noise. In the noisy case, we propose just using Protocol 4.
The security of the protocols is "forced security", which means Alice is forced by Bob's checks to not cheat in some batches of Protocol 1. It implies that the probability that some one-time tables with targeted (partial) security are generated would approach 1 in the noiseless case under quite weak assumptions about the parties (that Alice weakly cooperates by not cheating in some batches of Protocol 1, and Bob indeed does the checks due to that he is conservative), although the protocols allow aborts.
We show some applications in general two-party classical computation, and the cheat-sensitive implementations of oblivious transfer and bit commitment under some assumptions. To enjoy some quantum speedup together with the security benefit brought about by our preprocessing, we propose an interactive QHE scheme with costs polynomial in circuit size, as well as a constant-round QHE scheme with exponential cost, which use the precomputed one-time tables as a resource, but both schemes have more rounds of communication than in the original definition of QHE. Such scheme is then generalized to general two-party quantum computation with a publicly known circuit and private inputs on both parties, and to the case of private circuit provided by one party and private inputs on both parties. Our protocols provide check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations with the help of classical communication which do not carry information about the inputs in the generated correlations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II contains some introduction of the background. In Sec. III we introduce the quantum protocols for generating the one-time tables. Sec. IV shows applications in general two-party classical computation. Sec. V shows applications in general two-party quantum computation. Sec. VI shows applications in check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations with the help of classical communication. Sec. VII contains some discussions about the security in the noisy case, and physical implementations. Sec. VIII contains the conclusion and some open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
On computing two-party classical functions with quantum circuits, Lo [23] studied the data privacy for publicly known classical functions with the output on one party only. Buhrman et al [24] studied the security of twoparty quantum computation for publicly known classical functions in the case that both parties know the outcome, although with some limitations in the security notions. These and other results in the literature [25] suggest that secure bipartite classical computing cannot be generally done by quantum protocols where the two parties have full quantum capabilities. In the current work, the protocols allow aborts in the quantum preprocessing (Bob may abort when he detects that Alice has cheated), so the scenario considered here does not fit into the assumptions in the works mentioned above. We assume that one party values the privacy of his data higher than the possibility to learn the other party's data. Under such assumption, we do not require the parties in the main bipartite computation stage to be entirely classical.
Next, we introduce the simplest case in the one-time tables [4] . The bipartite AND gate with distributed output is a gate that takes as input two distant bits a and b, and outputs (a · b) ⊕ r and r on the two parties, respectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. (XOR is denoted as ⊕; AND is denoted as the · symbol.) It is sufficient for secure two-party classical computation, although there may be other constructions. Theoretically, the bipartite AND gate with distributed output on two distant input bits a and b can be computed while keeping both input bits completely private, with the help of a precomputed ideal one-time table of the nonlocal-AND type. Later we present methods for approximately generating such one-time tables. The one-time table has two locally-generated uniformly random bits x and y on the two parties, respectively, and also has (x · y) ⊕ r and r on the two parties, respectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. The steps for the bipartite AND-gate computation with distributed output are as follows:
Each party calculates an output bit according to the one-time table and the received message. Alice's output
The XOR of the two output bits is (x · b ) ⊕ (x · y) ⊕ r ⊕ (a · b) ⊕ r = a · b, while each output bit is a uniformly random bit when viewed alone, because r is a uniformly random bit. Since the messages a and b do not contain any information about a and b, the desired bipartite AND gate is implemented while a and b are still perfectly private.
III. THE QUANTUM PROTOCOLS FOR GENERATING ONE-TIME TABLES
The main quantum protocols to be introduced later are based on Protocol 1, which is the revised version of a subprocedure of a protocol from [26] . The Protocol 1 effectively computes an AND function on two remote classical bits from the two parties, with the output being a distributed bit, i.e. the XOR of two bits on the two parties. The security is not ideal: the plain use of such protocol would give rise to non-ideal security in (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption [26] , and the security is such that some additional verification need to be added in the protocol for it to be nontrivial. Later we propose protocols that check and sometimes combine the one-time tables generated from Protocol 1, to be used as a preprocessing stage for a bipartite classical or quantum computation task. The security level in those quantum protocols are higher than that achievable from the plain use of Protocol 1.
In Protocol 1, denote |+ := 1 √ 2 (|0 + |1 ), and |− := 1 √ 2 (|0 − |1 ), and the random bits are unbiased and independent of other variables by default. An EPR pair is two qubits in the state 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 ). The protocol involves teleportations [27] with partial information about the outcomes withheld by the sending party, and this can alternatively be implemented by the direct sending of quantum states that have been subject to certain Pauli operators just before sending; the later approach involves two qubits only. The teleportation approach allows Alice and Bob to do operations simultaneously, see the discussions in Secs. VI and VII. The protocol crucially depends on the property of the CNOT gate: it is equivalent to a CNOT gate in the reverse direction (with the roles of the two qubits switched) in an unbiased basis.
The Protocol 2 is a simplified version of Protocol 1. It replaces the initial teleportation with remote state preparation. This saves two local qubits of Alice. The teleportation in the backward direction could also be replaced with remote state preparation, but we do not see any resource savings, so we leave it unchanged.
We explain the last parts of Protocol 1. Even if Alice did a Z correction on the first qubit corresponding to Bob's sent bit (in fact she does not do it, but only adjusts the final outcome), she receives the two qubits with a possible σ y mask for each qubit (which are related to Bob's final outcome), together with possible simultaneous σ z masks on both qubits (which does not affect any Protocol 1 A quantum protocol for generating one-time tables of the nonlocal-AND type with partial privacy Input: A random bit x from Alice and a random bit y from Bob. Output: (x · y) ⊕ r and r on the two sides, where r is a random bit. The input and output together form the one-time table. 1. The two parties initially share four EPR pairs to be used in the teleportations. The steps 4 and 5 performed by Bob can be done concurrently with the Steps 2 and 3 performed by Alice.) Alice generates a random bit s. If s = 0, she encodes x's value into |x |0 ; if s = 1 and x = 0, she prepares the state |+ |+ ; in the remaining case s = x = 1, she prepares the state |+ |− .
(
3. She teleports the pair of qubits to Bob without telling him about the Pauli corrections except the following bit q: when s = 0, she tells him the bit for X correction on the first qubit; otherwise she tells him the bit for Z correction on the second qubit. When s = 0, she records the bit for X correction on the second qubit as t, otherwise she records the bit for Z correction on the first qubit as t. Then t is a random bit.
4. (Bob does not do any Pauli correction according to q. The q appears in a later step, in order to make the Steps 4 and 5 of Bob concurrent with Alice's initial operations.) If y = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two qubits, with the first qubit being the control qubit.
5.
Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, while withholding part of the information about the measurement outcomes: he calculates the XOR of the four correction bits, and sends the resulting bit w to Alice. Bob calculates the XOR of the two bits for X corrections (although they actually correspond to σy corrections due to the sending of a bit above) on the two qubits, and records the result as h.
6. After receiving Alice's sent bit q, Bob calculates h ⊕ (q · y), which is his output.
7. If s = 0, Alice measures the two received qubits in the Z basis, otherwise she measures them in the X basis. She calculates the XOR of four bits: the two outcome bits, the t, and s · w. The obtained bit is her output.
party's final outcome). Bob's outcome can alternatively be viewed as being obtained in the following way: if a σ y correction is needed for one received qubit, Bob regards his mask bit for that qubit as 1, and otherwise he regards it as 0. Bob's output bit in the protocol is the XOR of the two mask bits.
In Protocol 1, Alice's input bit has partial privacy even for a cheating Bob, while Bob's input bit is secure for an honest-but-curious Alice, but is not secure at all for a cheating Alice. The privacy of Alice's input bit x can be quantified using the accessible information or the trace distance. The accessible information, i.e. the maximum classical mutual information corresponding to Bob's possible knowledge about Alice's input, is exactly 1 2 bits, which happens to be equal to the Holevo bound in the current case. For a cheating Bob to get the maximum amount of information, his best measurement strategy in the current case is to use a fixed projective measurement: to measure the first qubit in the Z basis, and the second qubit in the X basis. The trace distance of the two density operators for Alice's two possible input values is 1 2 , by direct calculation (see also [26] ). Thus, the probability that Bob guesses Alice's input bit correctly is (1 + 1 2 ) · 1 2 = 3 4 . Note that with this particular measurement just mentioned, he cannot make the distributed output of the one-time table correct. In other words, Bob cannot learn the other party's input without consequences. We will see below that the similar remark can be said for Alice as well, implying that the protocol is secure in the honest-but-curious model.
To learn about Bob's input bit, a cheating Alice may use an entangled state 1 2 (|00 + |01 + |10 − |11 ). From Bob's returned state, and after correcting for the Pauli operator indicated by Bob's returned classical message, Alice may find out Bob's input bit with certainty.
In the following we present protocols which check or combine the one-time tables generated in Protocol 1. The first one has partial security for Alice and near-perfect security for Bob, while the second one involves checking by both parties, and aims for near-perfect security for both parties. The third one aims for near-perfect security for both parties with emphasis on the security of one party.
In Protocol 3, Alice's input bit has partial privacy, which is the same as in the analysis of Protocol 1 above. When the ratio q m is near one, the nonlocal correlations in the remaining unchecked one-time tables can be regarded as almost surely correct. This is because of Bob's Protocol 2 A simplified version of Protocol 1 using remote state preparation rather than teleportation Input: A random bit x from Alice and a random bit y from Bob. Output: (x · y) ⊕ r and r on the two sides, where r is a random bit. The input and output together form the one-time table. 1. The two parties initially share four EPR pairs.
(The steps 3 and 4 performed by Bob can be done concurrently with the
Step 2 performed by Alice.) Alice generates a random bit s. If s = 0, she measures two qubits in her part of the EPR pairs in the Z basis, and records her measurement outcome of the first qubit as q, and the outcome of the second qubit as t; if s = 1, she measures these two qubits in the X basis, and records her measurement outcome of the first qubit as t, and the outcome of the second qubit as q. The states |+ and |− are regarded as 0 and 1, respectively, in the recording. Then t is a random bit.
3. (Bob does not do any Pauli correction according to q. The q appears in a later step, in order to make the Steps 3 and 4 of Bob concurrent with Alice's initial operations.) If y = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two qubits, with the first qubit being the control qubit.
4. Bob teleports the resulting qubits to Alice, while withholding part of the information about the measurement outcomes: he calculates the XOR of the four correction bits, and sends the resulting bit w to Alice. Bob calculates the XOR of the two bits for X corrections (although they actually correspond to σy corrections due to the sending of a bit above) on the two qubits, and records the result as h.
5.
After receiving Alice's sent bit q, Bob calculates h ⊕ (q · y), which is his output.
6. If s = 0, Alice measures the two received qubits in the Z basis, otherwise she measures them in the X basis. She calculates the XOR of four bits: the two outcome bits, the t, and s · w. The obtained bit is her output.
Protocol 3 A partly-secure protocol for checking the one-time tables 1 . Alice and Bob perform many instances of Protocol 1 (sequentially or in parallel) to generate some one-time tables, and exchange messages to agree on which instances were successfully implemented experimentally. Suppose m one-time tables were implemented. The one-time tables labeled by j has inputs aj and bj, and outputs ej and fj.
2. Bob randomly selects q integers in {1, · · · , m}, which are labels for which one-time table. He tells his choices to Alice. The integer q satisfies that m − q is an upper bound on the number of required one-time tables in the main bipartite computing task, and the ratio q m is related to the targeted security level of the overall computation. 3. Alice sends the bits aj and ej to Bob for all chosen labels j.
4.
For any chosen label j, Bob checks whether aj and ej satisfy that aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj. If the total number of failures is larger than some preset number of Bob's (e.g. 0, or a small constant times m), he aborts the protocol, or restarts the protocol to do testing on a new batch of instances of Protocol 1 if the two parties still want to perform some secure two-party computation. Otherwise, the remaining one-time tables are regarded as having passed the checking and will be used later in the two-party classical computing task. They may repeat the steps above to prepare more one-time tables on demand.
checking. We require Alice to be weakly cooperating, that is, she does not cheat in some of the batches of instances, since otherwise no one-time table may pass the test. Some degree of weak cooperation is required for two parties to perform a computation anyway, and the above assumption of Alice has no effect on the data security of any party when Bob satisfies the assumption below, thus we may ignore the assumption above and just state the following assumption on Bob as the requirement of our protocols. In the following we assume that Bob is conservative, which means that he values the privacy of his data higher than the possibility to learn Alice's data.
Later in Sec. IV we will see that it effectively implies that he indeed does the checking. For an honest-but-curious Alice, the resulting correlation is correct, and she does not learn anything about Bob's input bit y (using the notations in Protocol 1, same below). In the following we discuss the case that Alice cheats.
If Alice cheats and gets at least partial information about Bob's input bit y, the state sent from Alice to Bob must be different from what is specified in the protocol; her best choice of state for cheating is mentioned previously. To pass Bob's test while learning about Bob's input y, she should know both y and r, or know both y and y ⊕ r. (The two conditions are equivalent in the exact case, but not necessarily equivalent in the partialinformation case.) In the following, let I M y denote the classical mutual information learnable by Alice about the bit y if she uses the measurement M, in an instance of Protocol 1. The I M r and I M y⊕r are defined similarly, but note that they are conditioned on the uniform distribution for y. Proposition 1. In Protocol 1, the follows inequalities hold:
where the two M are the same in each equation. All the quantities on the left-hand-sides are also dependent on Bob's received state σ A , which is defined after Bob doing some Pauli correction according to Alice's sent bit, rather than setting an ancillary bit as in Protocol 1. It is effectively prepared by Alice, and is a mixed state on two qubits (in numerical calculations, it is viewed as a pure state on two of Bob's qubits and two imaginary ancillary qubits), and the two σ A are the same in each equation. We abbreviate the symbol σ A . We use such definition instead of Alice's input state before teleportation, since it is more general: Alice could cheat by changing her operations in teleportation, but she always effectively prepares a (mixed) state on Bob's two qubits no matter what she does.
Proof. Let us fix a σ A which is Bob's received two-qubit mixed state, after he does Pauli corrections according to Alice's sent bit. The overall communication from Bob to Alice in Protocol 1 is only one classical bit (note the entangled states used in the teleportations are fixed and do not count towards the amount of communication), then, by the Holevo bound (also noting that there are effectively no other prior correlations between the two parties besides the fixed entangled state, so the locking of information [28] does not occur here), the amount of information that Alice learns about the joint distribution of y and r is upper bounded by 1 bit. The bits y and r are independent when Bob produces them, so the y and r are independent prior to Alice's measurement. Thus the inequality (1) holds, where we have assumed that the two σ A implicit in the information quantities are the same in this equation (same below). The bits y and y ⊕ r jointly determine y and r, and vice versa, so the amount of information that Alice learns about the joint distribution of y and y ⊕ r is upper bounded by 1 bit. And since the bits y and y ⊕ r are independent prior to Alice's measurement, we have that the inequality (2) holds. The inequalities (1) and (2) together imply (3) .
The probability that Alice passes Bob's test at a particular instance is related to the max(I M r , I M y⊕r ) in Eq. (3). When the probability of passing approaches 1, such maximum approaches 1, then it must be that one of them approaches 1. Then, Prop. 1 implies that Alice can learn almost nothing about y if she measured in the same basis, but in fact a cheating Alice knows which instances are remaining and will not be checked later (although it is conceivable that some checks may be done after the main computation, see Sec. VII below), so she can choose to do any measurement on the received states in these remaining instances. Such measurement may not be the same as M in the other term in Eq. (3). This implies that Eq. (3) alone is not sufficient for proving the security of Protocol 3.
Theorem 1. In Protocol 3, Bob's input is asymptotically secure.
Proof. We first consider the case that Alice's operations are independent among different instances of Protocol 1, and at last comment that the non-independent case still satisfy the extreme case of the inequalities above, giving rise to the security of Protocol 3.
Due to the freedom of measurement basis choice mentioned above, the Holevo bounds, which are upper bounds of the information quantities, are more relevant for proving the security of Protocol 3. Under the condition that Alice's operations are independent among the instances, we need only consider the Holevo bounds for a single instance of Protocol 1. Let χ y be the Holevo quantity which is the upper bound for I M y . It is defined as
where ρ j is the density operator that Alice receives from Bob for the case of y = j after Pauli corrections determined by Bob's sent bit, and ρ = 1 2 (ρ 1 + ρ 2 ). The S represents the von Neumann entropy. The quantities χ r and χ y⊕r are defined similarly, but note that they are conditioned on the uniform distribution for y. We claim that the following inequality holds for small positive and a nonnegative continuous function f ( ),
where f is continuous and f (0) = 0.
The reason is as follows. The Holevo quantities in Eq. (5) satisfy uniform continuity, because of the combination of the following two reasons: the ancilla in Alice's initial state σ A (introduced in Prop. 1) is effectively at most 4 dimensions due to the Schmidt decomposition, and note that such ancilla is also the ancilla for Alice's final state; the Holevo quantity χ y in (4) is continuous as a function of ρ 1 and ρ 2 and is therefore a continuous function of Alice's initial state σ A , and similarly, the Holevo quantities χ r and χ y⊕r are also continuous functions of Alice's initial state σ A . Given that the Holevo quantities satisfy uniform continuity, we obtain Eq. (5) by noting the fact that
where Eq. (6) holds because max(χ r , χ y⊕r ) = 1 implies that max(I M r , I M y⊕r ) = 1 for some M, and the latter implies χ y = 0 due to the construction of Protocol 1. The last implication is because of the following: given that I M r = 1 or I M y⊕r = 1, it must be that Bob's received state is some state corresponding to x = 0 or x = 1, but not superpositions of states from these two cases. For each of the x = 0 or x = 1 state, Bob decides his mask bits for whether to do σ y operations randomly, independent of the x or y. The returned state to Alice is the maximally mixed state no matter what y is. We have that χ y = 0 given such state. This shows that max(I M r , I M y⊕r ) = 1 for some M implies χ y = 0.
Alice may cheat in some instances of Protocol 1 so we may define a rate of cheating. Partial cheating in a instance is converted into a fractional number of cheating instances in calculating such rate. Alice's cheating probabilities among different instances may be correlated, but that does not affect the following argument since Bob randomly chooses which instances to check. It is sort of subjective for Bob to determine the average rate of cheating from the number of wrong results and the total number of tests in Protocol 3, since it depends on the a priori knowledge about the probability distribution for Alice's average rate of cheating, and also depends on the correlations between rates of cheating among different instances of Protocol 1. Suppose that after some checking, Bob estimates that Alice's average rate of cheating is , which is a small positive constant near 0, then the following approximation holds for the uniform distribution of y and r: max(χ r , χ y⊕r ) ≥ 1 − . Hence, χ y ≤ + f ( ) according to Eq. (5) . This shows that the expected amount of information about y learnable by a cheating Alice in the remaining instances of Protocol 1 is arbitrarily near zero for sufficiently small , even if she measures in different bases from those for the tested instances. The word "expected" means that even if L < 1, where L is the total number of one-time tables to be used for the main computation, Alice may sometimes learn about one or a few bits of Bob's input by chance, but on average, she learns not more than L bits. Since the information about y is linearly related to the information learnable by Alice in the later classical computation stage (see the bipartite AND-gate computation method in Sec. II), this shows the security of Protocol 3 for use in the later classical computation in the case that Alice's operations are independent among instances of Protocol 1.
In the following we consider the general case that Alice's operations are not necessarily independent among instances of Protocol 1. If Alice initially prepares some correlated quantum states among m instances, the generalization of Eq. (6) should hold, due to the similar reason as that after Eq. (6) . Then the generalization of Eq. (5) for the corresponding Holevo bounds should hold approximately near such extreme point, due to the uniform continuity of the Holevo bounds (as functions of Alice's joint input density matrix on multiple subsystems). This shows that the argument for the security for the case of independent operations of Alice can be extended to the general case.
Some numerical results are in Appendix A. To improve Alice's security in the protocol above, we propose the following Protocol 4, in which Alice also does some checking about Bob's behavior.
By noting that there is only one bit of classical communication from Alice to Bob in Protocol 1, the analysis for Protocol 3 about Bob's data privacy can provide hints for analyzing Alice's data privacy in Protocol 4. There are analogues of Prop. 1 and Theorem 1 for Alice instead of Bob, see Prop. 2 and Theorem 2 below. To draw an analogy to the analysis of Protocol 3, note that the output bits of Protocol 1 can alternatively be written as r on Alice's side and (x · y) ⊕ r on Bob's side, respectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. We state the following results. The I M
x is the classical mutual information learnable by Bob about Alice's input x using measure-Protocol 4 A protocol for checking the one-time tables by both parties 1. Alice and Bob perform many instances of Protocol 1 to generate some one-time tables, and exchange messages to agree on which instances were successfully implemented experimentally. Suppose m one-time tables were implemented. The one-time tables labeled by j has inputs aj and bj, and outputs ej and fj.
2. (The steps 2 to 4 can be done concurrently with the steps 5 to 7.) Bob randomly selects q integers in {1, · · · , m}, which are labels for which one-time table. He tells his choices to Alice.
3. Alice sends the bits aj and ej to Bob for all chosen labels j.
4. For any chosen label j, Bob checks whether aj and ej satisfy that aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj. If the total number of failures is larger than some preset number of Bob's (e.g. 0, or a small constant times m), he aborts the protocol, or asks Alice to restart the protocol to do testing on a new batch of instances of Protocol 1 if the two parties still want to perform some secure two-party computation.
5.
Alice randomly chooses p integers in {1, · · · , m}, and tells Bob her choices. The chosen set of integers may overlap with the set chosen by Bob.
6. Bob sends the bits bj and fj to Alice for the chosen labels j.
7. For any chosen label j, Alice checks whether aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj holds. If the total number of failures is larger than some preset number of Alice's, she aborts the protocol, or asks Bob to restart the protocol if needed.
8. The remaining one-time tables are regarded as having passed the checking and will be used later in the two-party classical computing task. They may repeat the steps above to prepare more one-time tables on demand.
ment M, in an instance of Protocol 1, where the M incorporates his possible CNOT gate, some Pauli corrections or equivalently some classical postprocessing, and Bell-state measurement with withheld masks. And the other quantities are defined similarly.
Proposition 2. In Protocol 1, the follows inequalities hold:
where the two M are the same in each equation.
Proof. The overall communication from Alice to Bob in Protocol 1 is only one classical bit (note the entangled states used in the teleportations are fixed and do not count towards the amount of communication), then, by the Holevo bound (also noting that there are effectively no other prior correlations between the two parties besides the fixed entangled state, so the locking of information [28] does not occur here), the amount of information that Bob learns about the joint distribution of x and r is upper bounded by 1 bit. (As mentioned below, the value of r is dependent on t, so it is not decided by Bob.) The bits x and r are independent, because r is an independent uniformly random bit, by the construction of Protocol 1: she takes the XOR of some intermediate result and a uniformly random bit t (generated by herself and independent from x) in the last step of Protocol 1. Thus the inequality (7) holds. The bits x and x ⊕ r jointly determine x and r , so the amount of information that Bob learns about the joint distribution of x and x ⊕ r is upper bounded by 1 bit. And since the bits x and x ⊕ r are independent, we have that the inequality (8) holds. The inequalities (7) and (8) together imply (9) .
Theorem 2. In Protocol 4, Alice's input is asymptotically secure.
Proof.
A difference from the proof of Theorem 1 is that the Holevo quantities are no longer needed, which is because Bob has no arbitrary input state to choose from. Bob's measurement is effectively fixed since he cannot change it after sending Alice some message (but he could refine such measurement, and in such case we could regard the refined measurement as the measurement he had done). From Eq. (9), we obtain that when max(I M r , I M x⊕r ) is near 1 (this would only happen when Alice checks most of the instances of Protocol 1 and finds that Bob is mostly correct), the I M x is near 0, and this implies that Bob is expected to not learn much about the x in the remaining unchecked instances.
It should be noted that when I M x is near 0, there is still some exponentially small probability that Bob may learn quite a significant portion of the information about x in the remaining unchecked instances. The quantitative security level is different from that obtainable by directly adapting Theorem 1 with the roles of two parties switched, at least on the following two points. First, Alice's data privacy has a nonzero lower bound here, see the analysis below Protocol 1. Second, with the same resource cost, Bob's data privacy is somewhat weaker than that in Protocol 3, since some of the one-time tables are used for Alice's checking now. Note that if the steps 2 to 4 are done simultaneously with the steps 5 to 7 with strict time requirement for the returned messages about a j and e j , and about b j and f j , then no party could cheat by calculating the "correct" bits after receiving the other party's bits, then Bob's data security level is the same as that in Protocol 3. Such strict time requirement is hard to impose in practice, since the required return time is about two times the distance between Alice and Bob divided by the speed of light, which is on the millisecond scale or less, because the distance is limited by photon transmission loss in entanglement generation (or in direct transmission if Protocol 1 is implemented by direct sending of qubits). This means the actual data privacy of Bob is worse than in Protocol 3, since he effectively checks about half of the instances as in Protocol 3, and Alice checks the other half. But the security should not be much worse since Bob randomly chooses which instances to check.
In Protocol 4, if any one party is conservative, his (her) data privacy is guaranteed. But partly due to the possible aborts, it actually suffices to assume either one of the parties is conservative in Protocol 4, since then the other party might as well be conservative to reach a better security level for himself (herself).
When one party's data privacy is very important, and the other party's data privacy is not too important, we propose the following Protocol 5. It improves the privacy of Alice's input in the later main computation task, while that of Bob's input is somewhat compromised.
In Protocol 5, the privacy of Alice's bit x for the combined one-time table is quite good: The accessible information for Bob is exactly 1 2 k bits, where k is the size of S in protocol description. It is because the different one-time tables from the first step are independent. The Holevo bound coincides with the accessible information in the current case.
For the privacy of Bob's input bit y in the combined one-time table, it is possible for a cheating Alice to do a joint measurement on k received states from Bob, to learn the information about y and r simultaneously as much as possible (or y and y ⊕ r). Bob can deal with this by testing more one-time tables. The resource usage (the amount of entanglement needed and the amount of communication) is estimated to be about O(tk 2 ) times that of Protocol 3, to achieve the similar level of privacy for Bob, where t is the total number of one-time tables required for the later main computation, and k is the size of S in Protocol 5. In such factor tk 2 , one k is for the size of S, and the additional tk factor means that about O(tk) one-time tables are used in the instance of Protocol 3 in the first step of Protocol 5. This factor appears because Alice may use techniques similar to Grover's algorithm to increase the amount of information she may learn about y, and the same input variable of Bob's may appear in the original circuit for at most t times. But in the case that the function to be evaluated is for evaluating a program provided by Bob on Alice's data, it is possible that each variable of Bob's appears only once, then the t factor can be omitted, so that the overhead becomes only O(k 2 ) compared to the plain use of Protocol 3.
The Protocol 5 differs from the previous protocols in that it has an extra step of combining the one-time tables, and its usage in the later bipartite computation task may be different by a switch of the roles of Alice and Bob. The success of the quantum protocols is not guaranteed in the presence of cheating, but this does not cause much problem since cheating is caught with high probability, and these protocols are in the preprocessing stage for the overall computation, so the useful data is not leaked. The failures in the quantum gates, measurements, and entanglement generation or qubit transmissions in the preprocessing stage can be tolerated by trial-and-error. The failures in Protocol 1 are required to be reported in the protocols, so they have no effect for the testing and later computations. In some experimental implementations the failures might not be reported and might appear as errors, and this would affect the security.
IV. APPLICATIONS IN TWO-PARTY CLASSICAL COMPUTATION
The following Protocol 6 is for evaluating a linear polynomial with distributed output using the quantum preprocessing protocols introduced above. The linear polynomial is of the form z = (c + j a j b j ) mod 2, where c is a constant bit known to Bob, and a j and b j are bits on Alice and Bob's side, respectively. The output is the Protocol 5 A protocol for generating improved one-time tables with combinations 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 3 or Protocol 4 to obtain some one-time tables after checking. Suppose the instance labeled by j has inputs aj and bj, and outputs ej and fj.
Bob determines which remaining one-time tables are to be combined into one new instance of one-time table, and tells
Alice his decision. Each new instance corresponds to a set S of old instances which satisfy that Bob's input bits are equal (denoted as c0). A new instance is constructed from the given set of old instances as follows: a := j∈S aj mod 2, b := c0, e := j∈S ej mod 2, f := j∈S fj mod 2.
XOR of two bits on different sides. If Protocol 3 is used in Protocol 6, the data privacy of one party is partial. The leakage is about half of his or her input bits. See also the comments after Protocol 7 below. Generally, we suggest using Protocol 4 in Protocol 6, since it at least aims for near-perfect security, although the actual security level is linearly related with noise.
For a generic boolean circuit, we propose Protocol 7. The main computation after the preprocessing does not include any aborts, and only requires the number of communication rounds to be about equal to the circuit depth. The circuit is assumed to be known to both parties, except for some initial local gates, which may be known only to the local party.
If Protocol 3 is used in Protocol 7 with the roles of Alice and Bob switched in the preprocessing only, the data privacy of Bob is partial. The leakage is about half of his input bits in each polynomial. But the privacy is better in the case that the function allows many different inputs of Bob to give rise to the same result. In the case that the function effectively evaluates a universal circuit with data given by Alice and the logical circuit given by Bob, his input has partial privacy which is acceptable due to possible recompilations of Bob's logical circuit. If Protocol 5 is used instead of Protocol 3, it is suggested that Alice always be the first party, to save the required number of one-time tables when Alice's data privacy is more important than Bob's data privacy. Then Alice's data in the main computation is asymptotically secure because of the property of Protocol 5. The remarks above are for the noiseless case. For the case with noise, see Sec. VII, where it is suggested that simply using Protocol 4 may be a good solution.
The Protocol 7 has a good property that cheating would usually give rise to wrong results. If some party (partially) cheated in generating some of the one-time tables, so that some but not all of the one-time tables used in Protocol 7 are not secure, then the insecure onetime tables are wrong with some significant probability according to Eq. (3): the calculation results for a particular nonlocal AND gate would often be incorrect after the distributed output bits are recombined. This implies that the final computation result has large probability to be wrong. But if that party cheated in all the generated one-time tables and passed the other party's test, the computation result could be calculated by the cheating party alone with the help of the messages sent from the other party in the main computation stage. The latter case is not likely to happen, since the other party could set a low threshold in the testing.
Some protocol similar to Protocol 7 could be used for evaluating a public circuit on shared classical secrets between Alice and Bob, when each effective input bit is the XOR of two remote bits. The steps are quite similar except for some initial local gates, so we abbreviate the protocol here.
In the following we discuss the security assumptions. We define Bob to be "conservative", if he values the privacy of his input data higher than the possibility to learn Alice's data.
First, let us assume that Bob honestly does the testing in the Protocols 3 and 5. There could be superpositions in the input and the output of these quantum protocols, but in the later classical computation task, the parties may do computational-basis measurements to force the received superposed states to collapse. Note that one party may insist on using the superposed output from some instance of the one-time table, but when the other party does some later gate using such output as an input, the latter party may do computational-basis measurements to force the collapse of the superposition.
Next, we discuss the case out of the assumption, that is, Bob cheats in the quantum protocols. He may cheat by not aborting after finding that Alice is cheating. This way of cheating is not powerful by itself, but see the following for discussion about his combined ways of cheating. The second way for him to cheat is to use general quantum input (allowing superpositions and entanglement) for the one-time tables, which also allows general Protocol 6 A protocol for evaluating classical linear polynomials with distributed output using one-time tables 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 3 or 4 or 5 to obtain some one-time tables.
2. For evaluating the linear polynomial z = (c + j ajbj) mod 2, Alice and Bob perform the evaluation of the nonlocal AND gate for aj and bj using the procedure in Sec. II, with the output being distributed. They locally calculate the XOR of all bits from the outputs, and Bob additionally takes the XOR with c. Each party obtains a bit as the output.
Protocol 7 A protocol for evaluating classical boolean circuits using one-time tables 1 . Alice and Bob decompose the two-party circuit to be evaluated into some local circuits with AND, XOR gates, and some linear polynomials with bipartite input, while adding possible ancillary bits with fixed initial values. Any nonlocal AND gate in the original circuit is a special case of the linear polynomial.
2. For each AND gate not in the initial stage, the inputs are distributed, i.e. each bit is the XOR of two remote bits. Alice and Bob decompose such gate into the XOR of the outputs of two local AND gates and two nonlocal AND gates, the latter being a special case of the linear polynomial. For the XOR gates with distributed input, they are expressed using two local XOR gates, with the output being distributed.
3. They perform the gates in the resulting circuit in pre-arranged order. The linear polynomials are evaluated using Protocol 6 with distributed output.
4.
At the end of the circuit, one party sends some bits to the other party so that the distributed bits for the output are recombined to form the correct output; if there are output on two parties, both parties need to send messages.
quantum output for the one-time tables. In such case, Alice may do computational-basis measurements in the main bipartite computation stage to force the collapse of superpositions. The case that he uses general quantum output for the one-time tables is discussed in the previous paragraph. For the case that Bob combines the two cheating methods above, if Alice is honest, Bob cannot get more information about Alice's data compared to the case of him not cheating in this way. If Alice also cheats, then it is possible that Bob's knowledge about Alice's data on average is better (e.g. when they discard some one-time tables, so that Bob obtains more information about Alice's input in the remaining one-time tables). But that comes at the expense of the higher possible leakage of Bob's data. So a conservative Bob should not do such combined cheating. The third way for Bob to cheat is by using superposed states in the main computation but not the preprocessing. This has no effect since Alice may make a computational-basis measurement on the state received from Bob in the main computation. Note that Alice's data leakage is limited by design of the quantum protocols, except in the case of non-conservative Bob discussed above. In conclusion, if we assume Bob to be conservative, the quantum protocols are asymptotically secure; if we assume Alice to be honest-but-curious, the Protocol 5 is asymptotically secure for Alice (as mentioned in Sec. III), and in such case it does not make much sense for Bob to cheat since he cannot gain from cheating.
In the following we consider implementing some cryptographic primitives such as oblivious transfer and bit commitment. The usual oblivious transfer (as opposed to 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer) [29, 30] , can be implemented in a cheat-sensitive way as follows. Again, it requires that one of the parties be conservative, in order for the one-time tables to be successfully and securely generated. In Protocol 8, if b = 0, the resulting product a · b is zero and does not carry any information about a ; otherwise, the result is a , so it transfers Alice's input bit to Bob. The protocol is cheat-sensitive in the sense that if Alice cheated in Protocol 5, it would have been detected and the protocol would have aborted. The protocol has approximate security, since the precomputed one-time tables are approximately secure.
We then consider 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. By choosing the linear polynomial of the type z = 2 j=1 a j b j , where b 1 + b 2 = 1, and if Bob asks Alice to send him the output she obtained from running the Protocol 6, Bob may accomplish the same function as 1out-of-2 oblivious transfer, with the additional property that Bob may ask Alice to send a 1 ⊕a 2 if he cheats by setting b 1 = b 2 = 1. The last point makes it different from the definition of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [29, 30] .
Protocol 9 A check-based quantum protocol for approximate cheat-sensitive bit commitment 1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 5 to obtain some onetime tables with the degree of security dependent on resource usage. They decide on a large integer m related to the intended security of the current bit commitment protocol.
2. Suppose Alice wants to commit a bit b. She asks Bob to together calculate m nonlocal AND gates using the method in Sec. II, with her input bits being always b, but Bob's inputs are random bits chosen by himself. They obtain some distributed bits as the outcomes. This completes the commit phase.
3. (Reveal phase) Alice sends Bob her output in the instances of the nonlocal AND gates in the previous step. Bob takes the XOR for the corresponding pairs of bits to recover the results of the nonlocal AND gates. From these results, Bob finds out b, or decides that Alice has cheated by sending him some random bit string so he cannot recover b.
There are some no-go theorems for quantum bit commitment [31, 32] . Since our quantum preprocessing protocols allow aborts, and there are some requirements on the players in those protocols, it is still possible that bit commitment can be implemented with the help of the one-time tables generated by the quantum preprocessing protocols. In the Protocol 9 we propose a bit commitment protocol using the above idea, inspired by a computationally-secure construction based on quantum one-way permutations [33] . Here, instead of using the quantum one-way permutations, we use a special bipartite classical computation with distributed output, with the help of quantum preprocessing. Our scheme is cheatsensitive and subject to some other assumptions similar to those for the generic Protocol 7. The protocol 9 requires that one of the parties be conservative, in order for the one-time tables to be successfully and securely generated.
In the last step of Protocol 9, if Alice sends Bob some random bit string, the results obtained by Bob are gen-erally not consistent with any input value of b. For large m, it is hard for Alice to guess the appropriate bit string to send to Bob to make him believe the input was 1 − b.
V. APPLICATIONS IN TWO-PARTY QUANTUM COMPUTATION
The methods in this work can be applied in two-party secure quantum computing tasks. When such tasks have classical input and output, they also serve as classical tasks of the type discussed in Sec. IV, but with quantum implementations. In this way, classical computational tasks are completed with quantum speedup and quantum security advantage. But this requires at least one party to have quantum capabilities beyond those required by Protocol 1. A typical problem in two-party quantum computation is quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE). In this work we present an interactive QHE scheme, and a constant-round QHE scheme. The main part of the constant-round scheme has three stages of communication, instead of two in the usual definition of QHE. The initial preparation of the one-time tables with checking and preparation of entanglement also involve a constant number of stages of communication.
In the QHE schemes below, there are some linear polynomials with at least 2n variables, where n is the number of qubits in Alice's input. The 2n variables correspond to Pauli masks in Alice's teleportation of the input data to Bob. The way Bob changes the coefficients of the linear polynomials is called coefficient-update rules below. The coefficient-update rules for the first 2n variables (and other variables mentioned below) under the action of Clifford gates can be easily obtained from the following relations:
where the ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and in the gate CNOT 12 , the qubit 1 is the control. The coefficientupdate rules for the variables under the T gate can be obtained from the relations TZ = ZT, TX = e −πi/4 PXZT.
The coefficient-update rules are analogous to the keyupdate rules in [10, 11] , but here the coefficients, rather than the Pauli keys (the variables), are updated.
An interactive QHE scheme with almost optimal information-theoretic data privacy and circuit privacy is obtainable by using the method in Protocol 6 to evaluate classical linear polynomials, and using the latter as a subprocedure in the Scheme 4 in [26] . Its resource usage is much smaller than the constant-round Scheme 1 below, which has cost exponential in the T-gate depth of the circuit. We still introduce Scheme 1 since there are interpolations between the interactive scheme and the Scheme 1, giving rise to some tradeoff between the number of rounds and the resource cost: the number of rounds may be fewer than in the interactive scheme, while the number of required one-time tables may be higher. This is achieved by running the Scheme 1 below for a segment of the circuit, and the two parties interact, and proceed to the next segment.
The Scheme 1 below is a three-message QHE scheme, with the main structure modified from some scheme with non-ideal security in [26] . A main technique of the scheme is to use a simplified version of a garden-hose gadget from [11] (and attached in Appendix B). The main part of the scheme has three stages of classical communication: from Bob to Alice, and from Alice to Bob, and a final teleportation from Bob to Alice. The schemes requires using some linear polynomials of the form in Protocol 6, but also some nonlinear polynomials, which can also be treated as linear polynomials (with the variables being the product of some original variables) in order to apply Protocol 6. The construction of the scheme depends on the following property: Bob's coefficients of the (nonlinear) polynomials (the constant term is not included here) do not depend on Alice's original Pauli mask bits or her measurement outcomes in the garden-hose gadgets. The latter independence is possible because we include Alice's previous measurement outcomes and her original Pauli mask bits, as well as her input bit for the garden-hose gadgets as variables. The XOR of Alice's and Bob's inputs for a garden-hose gadget correspond to a polynomial of previous variables, thus Bob's input to any garden-hose gadget can be expressed as a (nonlinear) polynomial of previous variables XORed with Alice's input to this garden-hose gadget, the latter being a new variable. Then the coefficients of Bob can be effectively regarded as independent of Alice's variables. Given the above choice of variables, the constant terms in the linear polynomials are determined by Bob's local measurement outcomes in his part of the garden-hose gadgets. Scheme 1 (A three-message QHE scheme using pre-computed one-time tables, with much higher cost than the interactive QHE scheme) 1. Alice and Bob produce a large number of one-time tables.
2. Bob calculates the XOR of each coefficient in the (nonlinear) polynomials with his input in a unique precomputed one-time table, and sends the resulting bits, and the labels for the corresponding onetime tables to Alice.
3. Alice teleports her n input data qubits to Bob without telling him any Pauli corrections. The 2n bits indicating the Pauli corrections are part of the variables in the linear polynomials to be evaluated. With the received message, Alice computes her part of the output of the (nonlinear) polynomials using the one-time tables, based on the method in Protocol 6. Alice records her part of the output of a (nonlinear) polynomial as a new variable, and according to its value, she does some appropriate P † gate followed by Bell-state measurements in the garden-hose gadgets (shown in Appendix B). The result for a Bell-state measurement corresponding to a X j Z k correction is recorded as two bits j and k. The measurement outcomes are part of the variables of the later linear polynomials. She calculates the XOR of each term in the next polynomial and her input bit in a unique one-time table, and sends the resulting bits to Bob. She proceeds to do this until she reaches the end of the circuit, including sending messages about the last 2n polynomials for the Pauli corrections.
Bob receives
Alice's message and calculates his output for the first polynomial (which is linear) using Protocol 6. The Bob part of the output of the first polynomial decides which measurements he should do in the first garden-hose gadget. He performs the Clifford gates and the T gate before the first garden-hose gadget, and performs the appropriate measurements in the first garden-hose gadget. The outcomes of those measurements help determine the constant term in the later (nonlinear) polynomials. He continues to do the next batch of gates and measurements. He evaluates some (nonlinear) polynomial, and according to his part of the output value of such polynomial, he performs the appropriate measurements in the corresponding garden-hose gadget. After the last T gate, Bob does his part in evaluating the last polynomials for calculating the final Pauli masks. The outcomes of those polynomials are distributed as the XOR of bits on the two parties. Bob teleports his output state to Alice while modifying the correction bits in the teleportation by taking the XOR with his part of the outcomes of the last polynomials.
5. Alice corrects the received state from teleportation with the corresponding Pauli masks, which are determined from Bob's message as well as her part of the output of the last polynomials. The resulting state is the final quantum output.
We analyze the resource cost of the interactive QHE scheme and the constant-round Scheme 1. Suppose R is an upper bound on the number of T gates in the circuit to be evaluated. In the interactive QHE scheme, the number of variables in a linear polynomial is at most 2n+4R. The factor 4 is from that each Bell-state measurement has two outcome bits, and Alice has two Bell-state measurements in each gadget. As there are R + 2n linear polynomials to be evaluated, and each variable requires one one-time table in the evaluation of a polynomial, the total number of consumed one-time tables is O(n 2 +R 2 ). In the Scheme 1, the number of variables in the first polynomial is 2n, but the second polynomial would be nonlinear and has 2n + (2n + 1) × 4 terms apart from the constant term. The term 1 in the brackets is for Alice's input bit of the garden-hose gadget. Suppose the k-th polynomial has f (k) terms apart from the constant term. Then f (k) = f (k − 1) + [f (k − 1) + 1] × 4 when k > 1, so when k = R, the number of terms is O(n · 5 R ). There are R linear polynomials which follow the induction rule above, but the last 2n polynomials do not follow the rule, as they are for independent Pauli corrections on the qubits. Thus the total number of consumed one-time tables is exponential in R while depending quadratically on n.
The security of the interactive QHE scheme and the Scheme 1 are optimal if the one-time tables have ideal security, where "optimal" means that Alice may learn information about Bob's input from the final output only, and Bob learns nothing at all about Alice's input. But in fact, the one-time tables have partial security, due to the finite number of checks and the noise (including errors), so the security of the scheme above is partial. See also the discussion below.
There are two points on which the security of two-party quantum computation may be somewhat weaker than in classical two-party computation based on the similar pro-cedures for generating one-time tables. First, it is less natural in the quantum protocol to impose classicality of the output of the one-time table. Imposing classicality of course helps security, but it is not necessary given our assumptions about the players in the preprocessing stage. In practice, we may assume that the output of the one-time tables have decohered prior to the use in the main computation. Second, in the interactive QHE scheme or the Scheme 1 given above, the Pauli masks for the original input qubits are used as the variables in all the linear polynomials involved, this means the data privacy is worse than in the case of classical bipartite computation, in which the intermediate variables replace the roles of the initial variables in many of the linear polynomials. But the use of the quantum preprocessing in this work would give rise to better data privacy than some of the schemes in later parts of [26] , because those schemes require correlated encoding of the different variables, while the variables in the current work are encoded independently by the one-time tables.
We now consider two-party computations in which the circuit is known to Bob only, and each party has some private (quantum) input data. A simple extension of the interactive QHE scheme works, where the extension is just by adding some input qubits on Bob's side. These qubits are not subject to any Pauli masks.
In the following we consider two-party quantum computations with publicly known circuit and private quantum inputs on both parties. One method is to use the simple extension of the interactive QHE scheme as in the last paragraph. A simplified method is to make use of the fact that the circuit is publicly known. We briefly describe it below.
Since the circuit is publicly known, those one-time tables for the linear polynomial for the first P † correction after the first T gate are not needed, since Alice can calculate by herself the contributions to this P † correction due to her original Pauli masks. She could just tell Bob before the protocol starts to choose a fixed input on his side in the first garden-hose gadget, then she could decide her input for this gadget on her own. But Bob's measurement outcomes in the garden-hose gadgets are not known to Alice, and they should affect the subsequent P † corrections. Hence, in later garden-hose gadgets, Bob's input cannot be fixed, and the rest of the scheme is similar to the interactive scheme, but with some extra (quantum) input data on Bob's side. In the case that Alice's input is classical, the initial teleportation can be replaced with classical communication with withheld bit-flip masks. If the output is on Bob's side, Bob need not send any message after Alice's message, and Alice sends him some bits for Pauli corrections at the end. In the case that the output is on Alice's side and is classical, the final teleportation from Bob to Alice can be replaced with classical communication without any masks.
VI. APPLICATION IN CHECK-BASED IMPLEMENTATION OF NO-SIGNALING CORRELATIONS WITH THE HELP OF INERT COMMUNICATION
The Protocol 1 for generating the one-time tables together with Protocol 4 for checking them effectively implement the PR-box (Popescu-Rohrlich box [34] ) type of correlations. The implementation needs time in communication, and involves some inert communication, i.e. sending of some classical messages which do not contain useful information about the inputs (in the "useful" onetime tables, but not in those one-time tables subject to checks and not actually used). So this is not a direct implementation of the PR box, which must be instantaneous. Rather, it is a check-based implementation of the PR-box type of correlations with time cost and inert communication cost. The fact that it is check-based implies that it is not a deterministic protocol, but forced almostdeterministic, meaning that the checking party could set the threshold to very low so that the other party must be nearly completely honest to avoid aborting, and if the parties are indeed nearly completely honest, the protocol is almost deterministic. However, in Protocol 1, after the initial entanglement has been established, the two directions of teleportation and partial sending of the measurement outcomes can be done simultaneously. This does have some partial flavor of "instantaneous" implementation.
The PR box is no-signaling, so a natural question is whether there is a no-signaling theory that could exist as a physical theory while allowing implementation of the PR boxes. Some "information causality" principle has been suggested in the literature that may exclude such no-signaling theories [35] . Whether our protocols provide any insight on the "information causality" principle suggested in [35] is currently unclear, but they are compatible with such principle in the following sense. In evaluating linear polynomials using Protocol 6, the required communication in any direction quantitatively agrees with the amount of required communication suggested by [35] . The latter is because each one-time table requires one bit of classical communication in each direction, and Bob may choose his inputs so that he effectively asks Alice to send one of her input bits to him (when a final sending of a bit to Bob is added at the end of the protocol).
In the following, we show how to implement the following general type of no-signaling correlations in [35] in the check-based way.
with 0 ≤ E ≤ 1. According to an argument in [36] (also mentioned in [35] ), the form (12) is representative of a large class of no-signaing correlations (those with input and output dimensions 2 on both sides). The way to implement the no-signaling correlations above is similar to the implementation of the PR-box correlations above, but with an additional step in those instances of Protocol 1 not subject to checking but used for the final correlations: Bob randomly flips his output bit with probability 1 2 (1 − E). Such probabilistic step is not involved in the instances of Protocol 1 subject to checking, so Protocol 4 still applies, although with the output correlations changed. A drawback of such implementation is that Bob knows the original value of his output bit, so he may recover a PR-box type of no-signaling correlation. A non-perfect way of dealing with this is to change the last step to that Alice and Bob both flip the respective output bit with some probability p = 1− √ E 2 so that (1 − p) 2 + p 2 = 1+E 2 . Such modified protocol still has the similar drawback that one party could recover a no-signaling correlation with parameter larger than intended.
VII. DISCUSSIONS

Extensions of protocols
The qubit-based quantum protocols in this work can be generalized to work for qudits in principle. This is inspired by the classical case in [4] . This requires some changes in the classical usage of the generated correlations.
The methods in this work are extendable to multipartite classical computation in principle. Some pairs of parties (possibly including some server) may prepare onetime tables using the quantum protocols in this work.
A method of enhancing the security by additional checks after the computation is as follows. If one party, say Alice, does not require the long-term security of her input in the main computation, Bob may ask her to do additional checking of the one-time tables used in the main computation, at a time such that her input data is no longer sensitive, to make sure that she has not cheated by a lot. Of course, in some practical applications, the final computation result provides some check against Alice's cheating, since Alice usually has to cheat all the way to the end for a generic computation to be correct (provided that the final result is on her side, not distributed as the XOR of remote bits), and always cheating successfully is unlikely to happen because of the inequalities in Sec. III.
Due to experimental limitations and the overhead from the checkings, the number of one-time tables generated by our quantum protocols may be insufficient if a large two-party computation is to be performed. In that case, it is possible to use some classical processing of the quantum-generated one-time tables, to generate more one-time tables with computational security. Note that extensions of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers is studied in [37] , but our one-time tables correspond to the original oblivious transfer, rather than 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. Nonetheless, some similar method of extension of the quantum-generated one-time tables might be possible.
Physical implementations of Protocol 1
The Protocols 1 and 2 differ in that the latter involves remote state preparation using shared entanglement, while in the former protocol, Alice locally prepares some state, and uses teleportation [27] . Such method requires two more qubits holding Alice's initial state, compared to Protocol 2. Another way to implement the first steps is that Alice directly sends two qubits that have been subject to certain Pauli operators just before sending. After receiving them, Bob does a CNOT gate or the identity, and applies some Pauli gates to the two qubits, and sends the two qubits back to Alice. Under the two methods of using entanglement (the remote state preparation method and the teleportation method), entanglement could be prepared by a fixed entanglementgenerating device, allowing for failures in preparation (although we allow failures in the whole Protocol 1, so failures in any particular step is not of much concern). This may also help getting rid of the issue of multiple photons in direct communication, which would harm Bob's data privacy (although some schemes with the direct send-ing of photons may also allow the detection of multiple photons). Using generation of entanglement could also increase the allowed distance between Alice and Bob, if the entanglement is generated by a device at the middle, compared to using direct sending. As for detector inefficiencies and dark counts, the fact that the Protocol 1 can be redone after failure can help mitigate the effects of these issues. The appeal of the direct sending approach is significant, due to that only two qubits are used (although the optical implementation of the CNOT gate with checking for multiple photons may involve some ancillary qubits), and failure of the whole Protocol 1 is allowed, making the optical implementations worth considering.
Effects of noise and errors
If direct sending of photons is used in Protocol 1, we suggest using the known methods such as decoherencefree subspaces or quantum codes, to reduce or prevent the errors in the transmission. We leave the details for future work. In the following, we analyze the theoretical impact of noise (including errors) on our protocols.
We consider the case that the main computation is classical, since the quantum case is similar in that it also involves evaluating classical linear polynomials. When Protocol 3 with noise is used for a bipartite classical computation task, and if Alice's data privacy is more important than Bob's, we suggest that Alice who is the first party in the main computation be the second party in the preprocessing. Then the data leakage of Alice is about the product of the circuit size (the number of the onetime tables) and a small constant indicating the noise level. This is because in Protocol 3, the physical errors and the first party's cheating look about the same for the second party in the verifications (the "first party" in this sentence is the Bob in the main computation). For circuits with a high level of parallelism, the data leakage of Alice per input bit is about the product of circuit depth and the error constant described above. So the allowed circuit depth is a constant, which is inverse proportional to the error constant. Similar remarks can be said for Protocol 4 for both sides.
If Protocol 5 based on Protocol 3 is used for a bipartite classical computation task, we suggest that Alice be the first party both in the preprocessing and the main computation. The noise level is not directly related to the data privacy of Alice, as it mainly affects the correctness of the computation, and Bob's data privacy. If the noise level is not too low, Bob's data privacy in Proto-col 5 would not be too good, since he has some identical inputs, and Alice could try to learn partially about each of them to recover his true input. In this case, we suggest simply using Protocol 4. An alternative would be using Protocol 3 with "recompilation", that is, using some new publicly-known function instead of the original function, with Bob's input changed accordingly, while Alice's input is unchanged, so that the result is the same as the original function with the original input of Bob. If the new function is chosen so that it encodes universal classical circuits, and the possible new inputs of Bob are long enough, we can achieve a good level of security for Bob's input. Such recompilation can be done by classical preprocessing.
There have been studies of the effects of noise in classical cryptographic tasks, and noise is not always bad for security [38] . Note that adding some assumptions about quantum capabilities may improve the security in bit commitment [39] . Adding similar assumptions on top of our quantum preprocessing protocols may improve the security in the applications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed some quantum protocols for approximately generating a certain type of classical correlations (a special case of the one-time tables [4] ) with varying degrees of privacy, to be used in bipartite secure computation tasks. We have shown how to use the generated one-time tables in evaluating linear polynomials and generic boolean circuits, and in cheat-sensitive oblivious transfer and cheat-sensitive bit commitment, as well as in (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption and general two-party secure quantum computation. In the discussions we have mentioned that our method gives a check-based implementation of the PR-box type of correlations, but with some communication time cost, and involves sending of classical messages which do not contain useful information about the inputs, so it is not a direct implementation of the PR box. Some other no-signaling correlations can also be generated in the checked-based way with the help of similar classical communications. Open problems include: applications in check-based cheat-sensitive quantum implementation of other cryptographic primitives, which may be weaker than the plain version of the primitives; whether there is a constant-round QHE scheme with costs polynomial in circuit size; a refined analysis of the protocols, taking into account the physical errors in quantum states and operations; fault-tolerance; application to special classes of circuits or functions; design of experimental schemes.
Numerical calculations suggest the following inequalities.
where c is a constant somewhat larger than 1.388 and is yet to be precisely determined. This implies that χ y + max(χ r , χ y⊕r ) ≤ c.
Numerics suggest that near the ends of the tradeoff curve indicated by Eqs. A1 and A2, one quantity approaches 1 bit while the other quantity approaches 0. For some of Bob's received state that approaches the numerically found maximal value of the left-hand-side, the two terms on the left-hand-side of Eq. (A3) are about equal, and the corresponding sum in the left-hand-side of Eq. (3) under projective measurements is numerically found to be not greater than 1 bit. The latter sum is observed to have the same property for initial states satisfying max(χ r , χ y⊕r ) ≈ 1. When there is no ancilla, numerics suggest that the left-hand-side of Eq. (A3) is not greater than 1 bit. As quantitative examples for Eq. (5), we have f (0.1) ≈ 0.3, and f (0.01) ≈ 0.06. An illustration of Eq. (A3) by numerical calculations is in Fig. 1 . The Fig. 2 shows a simplified version of a gadget in [11] for correcting an unwanted P gate due to a T gate in the circuit with certain prior Pauli corrections. The input qubit starts from the position "in", and ends up in a qubit which is initially maximally entangled with Bob's qubit labeled "E" [in the state 1 √ 2 (|00 + |11 )]. The unwanted P on this qubit is corrected, but some other Pauli corrections are now needed because of the Bellstate measurements. These Pauli corrections are to be accounted for in the later evaluation of linear polynomials in Scheme 1. Note that in each use of this gadget, some of the Bell-state measurements are not actually performed. Alice's two Bell-state measurements are on the same pairs of qubits irrespective of q. [11] for applying a P † to a qubit initially at the position "in" if and only if p + q = 1 (mod 2), using the "garden hose" method. The dots connected by wavy lines are EPR pairs. The curved lines are for Bell-state measurements. For example, if p = 0 and q = 1, the qubit is teleported through the first and the third EPR pairs, with a P † applied to it by Alice in between. The transformed state of the input qubit always ends up in a qubit on Bob's side which is initially maximally entangled with the qubit labeled "E" [in the state 1 √
